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NEW ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS IN ILLINOIS
A PRELUDE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION

Until the recent amendment of the Adoption Act, the father
of an illegitimate child in Illinois was accorded a legal status
almost equivalent to a non-entity. The prior Adoption Act
simply ignored his existence when it defined the term parent
as: "[T]he father and mother of a legitimate child, the surviving parent of a legitimate child, or the natural mother of an
illegitimate child."' Such father was decisively by-passed in the
matter of consent to the adoption of his offspring:
A consent shall not be required from the father of an illegitimate
child . . . nor shall a consent be required from the father of an
illegitimate child nothwithstanding that the father of such child
has been ordered to support such
child in accordance with the
2
provisions of the Paternity Act.
In further eliminating the father from adoption proceedings, the prior Act specified as persons who were available for
adoption, "A child to whose adoption a person authorized by law,
other than his parents, has consented, or to whose adoption no
consent is required pursuant to Section 8 of this Act ;-3 as quoted
above, section 8 clearly did not require the consent of the father
of the illegitimate child.
Several other legislative acts reenforced this attitude. While
the Paternity Act recognized the father's right to adopt his own
illegitimate children, in effect, it relegated him to the role of a
legal stranger in such proceeding:
A person charged or alleged to be the father of a child born out
of wedlock, whether or not adjudicated the father under this Act,
shall have no right to the custody or control of the child except
such custody as may be granted pursuant to an adoption proceed4
ing initiated by him for that purpose.
The Juvenile Court Act likewise deprived the father of any
natural rights in the illegitimate child by duplicating the definition of "parent" used in the Adoption Act, 5 and by defining a
dependent minor as "any minor under 18 years of age (a)
who is without a parent, guardian or legal custodian. '"
In essence, when the mother of an illegitimate child died, the
1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 E (1971).
2 Id § 9.1-8 (e).
3 Id. § 9.1-1 H (b).
4 Paternity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106%, § 62 (1971).
'ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1971).
The definition also includes
any adoptive parent; it specifically excludes a parent whose rights in respect
to the minor have been terminated in any manner provided by law.
6 Id. § 702-5 (1). The definition also includes any minor under 18 years
of age:
(b) who is without proper care because of the physical or mental
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child was automatically without parents. Such child could become a dependent without any hearing on the parental fitness
of the unwed father, and without the proof of neglect that is
required before the state can assume custody of the children of
married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers. If the
child was adoptable, the court was empowered to appoint a
guardian authorized to consent to the adoption of the minor
without any reference to the natural father.' If the unwed
father sought the adoption, the burden fell on him to establish
not only that he would be a suitable parent, but also that he
would be the most suitable of all who might want custody of the
child."
Procedurally, such legislation proved efficient. To terminate her rights, the consent of the unwed mother or a declaration of her unfitness cleared the path for adoption proceedings.
In the case of an agency adoption, placement by the agency was
all that was needed, once the mother had surrendered the child. If
a legal guardian had been appointed, his consent was sufficient.
The identity or whereabouts of the unwed father was of no
concern, and even in those rare instances where he claimed a
right to be heard in the adoption proceeding, the unwed father
was informed that he had no such legal right, at least not in
Illinois.
Practically, the exclusion of the unwed father from adoption
proceedings seemed equitable. The result matched the reality
that few fathers of illegitimate children exhibit concern for their
offspring or are willing to publicly pronounce their paternity,
and fewer still have attempted to make any legal claim in a court
action. 9 (The concern of the Adoption Act was to protect the
disability of his parent, guardian or custodian; or
(c) who has a parent, guardian or legal custodian who with good
cause, wishes to be relieved of all residual parental rights and responsibilities, guardianship or custody, and who desires the appointment of a
guardian of the person with power to consent to the adoption of the
minor.
7

d. § 705-9 (2).
s The United States Supreme Court advanced this interpretation of the

Illinois statute in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
9 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972), referring to the
state's argument that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable parents. See
also the dissenting opinion of Justice Burger to the Stanley decision at
665-66, pointing out that unwed fathers rarely burden either the mother or
the child with their attentions or loyalties; indeed, many unwed fathers either
deny all responsibility to the illegitimate child or exhibit no interest in the

child's welfare. The guardian ad litem of the Circuit Court of Cook County,

who represents the interests of the minor in all adoption proceedings, notes
that fathers of illegitimate children traditionally tend to disappear once they
learn of the pregnancy, as the prospect of support looms over them. The
guardian ad litem does not foresee a great rally by these fathers to assert
their new rights under the amended Adoption Act. He notes that only
about 1% of such fathers have come into court since the new requirement
of the putative father's consent, and no case has been litigated since People
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welfare of the child and was promoted by eliminating the often
complicated and time-consuming procedure of identifying the
father, finding him, and procuring his consent.
However, in 1972, the United States Supreme Court dispelled on three occasions the notion that the rights of any individual can be subordinated to procedural efficiency.
Stanley v. Illinois-° first challenged the Illinois statutory
definition of parent and the consequences which flow from it. But
Stanley was not an adoption situation. The couple had lived
together intermittently for eighteen years and had three children. During those years the unwed father had supported them.
Upon the mother's death, the children were declared wards of
the court after a dependency hearing under the Juvenile Court
Act. Stanley claimed that married fathers and unwed mothers
could not be deprived of their children under Illinois law without
a showing of unfitness; he, as an unwed father, was deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The United States Supreme Court agreed that the
state cannot presume a father's unfitness because his children are
illegitimate. The Court stated that all Illinois parents (including
the father of an illegitimate child) are constitutionally entitled,
under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, to a due process hearing on
unfitness, before their children can be removed from their custody." The Court further concluded that state laws which deny
a putative father the right to be heard in proceedings involving
custody of natural born children violate equal protection prin2
ciples.
Two weeks after Stanley, the Supreme Court twice emphasized its holding. In Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan," as in Stanley,
only the putative father's right to custody was involved. The
couple had been granted a divorce, but resumed marital relations
without remarriage. The Illinois court had awarded the father
custody of two children born to the pair after their divorce. The
children had lived with him for four years, during which time
he supported them. The Illinois appellate court returned them to
the mother under the Paternity Act, because the father of a child
born out of wedlock had no right to custody or control of the
child under Illinois law. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of
4
Stanley.'
ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, decided almost two years ago.
52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
10 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11Id. at 657.
12 Id. at 649.
13126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970).
14405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
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Any speculation as to whether Stanley extended to an adoption situation was settled on the same day as Vanderlaan by the
Court's holding in Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services.'5 In
Rothstein, the illegitimate child had been placed in the adoptive
parents' home within two weeks after birth. Only the parental
rights of the mother had been terminated through her consent.
The unwed father had not been notified of the adoption, nor did
he consent to the termination of his parental rights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that the relevant Wisconsin statutes granted the mother alone the power to terminate parental
rights and to consent to adoption of a child born out of wedlock;
the putative father had no parental rights and no right to notice
of any hearing prior to such proceeding.16 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of
Stanley, with due consideration for the completion of the adoption
proceedings and the fact that the child had apparently lived with
the adopting family for the intervening period.
A month after Vanderlaan and Rothstein were decided, a
pending Illinois case provided the vehicle to bring Illinois law
within the dictates of Stanley. In Slawek v. Covenant Children's
Home," a child had been placed for adoption by a licensed adoption agency, after the mother alone consented to the adoption.
The unwed father was denied habeas corpus when he sought to
obtain custody of the child, claiming that the agency knew he
was the father, and had finalized the adoption without notice to
him and without his consent. The father also claimed that the provisions of the Adoption Act which precluded him from asserting
any right to the child in adoption proceedings, as well as the
provision of the Paternity Act which denied a putative father the
custody of his child absent his attempt to legally adopt the child,
were unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court in Slawek
agreed: "[T]he provisions of the Adoption and Paternity Acts
are unconstitutional insofar as they are in conflict with Stanley,
'
Rothstein and Vanderlaan."'
The Illinois legislature, acting with surprising speed, set
about erasing the defects in the existing Adoption Act, as underscored by Stanley and Slawek.1" The changes in the Act, which
became effective on October 1, 1973, clarify the concept that the
father of a child sought to be adopted, whether legitimate or
15 d.
16 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
17 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
is Id. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 292.
19 Changes were made in the Adoption Act by the 1973 Illinois Legisla-

ture in S. B. 346. The legislature also amended certain sections of the Juvenile Court Act and the Paternity Act to conform to the amended Adoption
Act, but these changes are not examined here.
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illegitimate, must be notified of adoption proceedings, and his
rights must be terminated either by his consent or through a
sound declaration of unfitness by the court. This article will note
the changes in the Act and will suggest some means to satisfy
their requirements.
NOTICE TO THE PUTATIVE FATHER

Perhaps the simplest yet most pervasive change in the Act
is in the term "parent," which is now defined as "[t]he father
or mother of a legitimate or illegitimate child. ' 20 Each use of
the term throughout the Act includes both parents, so that the
same rights automatically flow to the father of an illegitimate
child as were previously accorded married parents and unwed
mothers.
Among these rights are notice of the adoption proceedings
and a due process hearing before either party can be deprived of
his parental status. Both such rights presume proper identifi2
cation of the father. Section 12a has been added to the Act '
for the purpose of establishing the father's identity with as much
2
certainty as is possible.2
Section 12a should be followed strictly.23 To best utilize it,
the natural mother should be asked to name the father prior to
the birth of the child, if possible. Immediately thereafter, any
interested party can request in writing that notice of intention
to place the child for adoption be served on the father. Interested parties include the natural mother, the person intending to
adopt the child, a child welfare agency, or an attorney representing a party.24 Upon request, the clerk of the court will serve
section 12a notice to the alleged father in the same manner as
summons is served in other civil proceedings, or in lieu of personal service, he will mail it to the alleged father's last known
address.25 Unlike the former requirement, section 12a specifies
that "The names of adoptive parents shall not be included in the
ILL. REV. STAT.
21 Id. § 9.1-12a.
20

ch. 4, § 9.1-1 E (1973).

22 Occasionally section
12a serves the further purpose of originally
notifying the father that he is a father. The dissenting opinion in Stanley
notes at 665 that many unwed fathers are simply not aware of their parenthood. A problem exists as to how such father can consent if he is totally
oblivious to his parental status. The section enlightens him, both as to his
status and to his rights.

23On a number of occasions, the courts have held that the Adoption Act,
being in derogation of the common law, should be strictly construed. See
Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 86, 90, 56 N.E. 303, 305 (1900). More recently, the
court has accepted substantial compliance with the statute. Gebhardt v.
Warren, 399 Ill. 196, 77 N.E.2d 187 (1948).
In the absence of judicial
interpretation of the amended Act, the safer procedure would seem to be a
strict adherence to the new requirements.
24 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-12a(1) (1973).

2 Id.
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notice. ' 20 As detailed in section 12a, the notice informs the
putative father that the mother intends to place the child for
adoption, that he has legal rights in the child, and if he intends
to keep such rights, he must file a declaration of paternity within
2
thirty daysY.
If the identified party is not the father, the notice informs
him that he should file a disclaimer of paternity with the court,
which will automatically terminate any rights he may have had
and cancel any notice of further proceedings.28- If he fails to file
the declaration of paternity within the time specified, an order
can be entered terminating all of his rights without further notice to him. 29 He will thereafter not be made a party to the
adoption proceedings nor will he be further informed regarding
them. If he files a declaration of paternity, stating that he is in
fact the father and that he intends to retain his legal rights, or
if he requests notice of any further proceedings, he will be informed if a proceeding is brought for the adoption of the child.30
To encourage him to declare his paternity, section 12a insulates the putative father against possible repercussions by
stating that "All such records shall be impounded."' 1 Once paternity is acknowledged, the notice form is secured in the files
pertaining to the adoption and it can never be used for a purpose
other than the adoption. The mother cannot use it in a separate
paternity suit or in any other way against him.
In most situations, the identification of the father for purposes of notice is fairly certain, even though his name does not
appear on the birth certificate or he has not been legally declared
the father in a paternity suit. In some instances, however, the
natural mother may disclose that one or more of several individuals may be the father of the child in question. Section 12a
notice should be sent to each possible candidate. Either one name
will be secured with certainty, or the rights of all the named
parties will be forever terminated.
Further, the possibility that the mother might, by design or
otherwise, name a party who in reality is not the father of her
child, cannot be overlooked. The mother's identity is almost
always positive - she is either named on the birth certificate
or, if necessary, the doctor who delivered the child can testify to
her maternity. But often only the mother's word exists regarding the identity of the father. Whenever any doubt arises,
26

27

d. § 9.1-12a(2).

Id.

Id.
29d. § 9.1-12a(4).
30 Id. § 9.1-12a(5).
31
Id. § 9.1-12a(6).
28
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neither the attorney nor the parties who intend to adopt the child
should sign the original request that notice be sent to the putative
father. While the actual notice provided by section 12a must be
signed by the clerk of the court, "S 2 the original written request
should be signed only by the mother. This procedure insures
caution on her part in naming the father of the child and, if
nothing more, protects all other parties from an unpleasant law
suit for libel.
Section 12a solves many of the problems which followed
the Stanley decision."
As indicated, the section is especially
effective because it settles at an early stage the question of who
must be involved in adoption proceedings, and it eliminates certain parties who might conceivably make a claim against the
adoption in the future.
CONSENT

If and when the father is identified and declares his paternity, his consent to the adoption must be sought. Section 8 of the
Adoption Act provides that "consents shall be required in all
cases." The only exceptions to this requirement are for persons
34
whom the court has found to be unfit.
Consents can be obtained from the parents of the adoptive
child, from the child's legal guardian if there is no surviving
parent, from an agency if the child has been surrendered for
adoption to that agency,"5 or from any person or agency that has
legal custody of the child by court order when parental rights
have been terminated and the court has authorized such consent.36
The clause in the former Act - that no consent was required of
the father of an illegitimate child even though he had been ordered to support the child under the Paternity Act"7 - has been
stricken and, under the new definition of parent, his consent is
clearly required. If either the natural father or mother of the
child is the party seeking the adoption, execution and verification
of the adoption petition by that parent is equivalent to his consent . 8
Section 9B of the amended Act provides that "[n]o consent
32

Id. § 9.1-12a(2).

3 For a discussion of the variety of problems created by Stanley, many
of which are resolved by the amended Act, see General Practice Newsletter,
Ill. State Bar Ass'n, vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1973).
34 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 4, § 9.1-8.

A surrender is similar to a consent, except that the parent permanently and irrevocably entrusts the child to an agency for the purpose of
adoption. Once a valid surrender is given, the agency stands in the place of
the parent. The agency submits the consent when the adoptive parents
become specific. This also applies to a guardian appointed by the court in a
dependency or neglect proceeding, if the guardian was authorized to consent.
35

36 ILL. REV. STAT.
31 ILL. REV. STAT.
3"

ch. 4, § 9.1-8(a) (b) (c) (d) (1973).
ch. 4, § 9.1-8(e) (1971).
9.1-8(e) (1973).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §
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or surrender shall be taken within the 72 hour period immediately following the birth of the child.'

9

While this word-

ing varies slightly from the former provision, 40 the effect on the
mother is the same - she cannot consent to her child's adoption
until seventy-two hours after its birth. However, section 9C
has been added as an exception for the father by stating that
"A consent or a surrender may be taken from the father prior
to the birth of the child."'4

This provision blends with section

12a, which allows notice to be sent to the putative father any
time after the conception of the child, and it allows early removal
of a possible barrier to a prompt adoption proceeding.
When the mother consents to or surrenders her child for
adoption not less than seventy-two hours after its birth, her

action is irrevocable.42 But if the father has consented prior to
the birth of the child, he can revoke such consent or surrender
within seventy-two hours after the birth by notifying whoever
took the consent or surrender of his revocation. 43 Unless he does
so within the seventy-two hour period, his consent also becomes
4
4

irrevocable.

5
Finality of consent is subject only to section 11 of the Act,'
which provides for revocability of consent or surrender when it
has been obtained by fraud or duress, if a court of competent
jurisdiction so finds. However, an amendment to section 11
narrows the scope of the fraud or duress that can affect revocability to:
[F]raud or duress on the part of the person before whom such
consent, surrender, or other documents equivalent to a surrender

is acknowledged . . . or on the part of the adopting parents or

their agents ...
46
This clause seems to negate as fraud any pressure to give up her
child which might be applied to the unwed mother by her own
parents or by the unwed father. Such limitation provides
added protection against future attack on the adoption, particularly where a child has been living with adoptive parents for a
considerable time and the mother undergoes a change of heart
regarding adoption.
When signed by a parent, a consent must be personally
acknowledged by the signing parent before the presiding judge
39 Id. § 9.1-9 B.
40 The prior clause read that "No consent or surrender shall be taken
until the passage of 72 hours after the birth of the child." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 4,41 § 9.1-9 (1971).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-9 C (1973).
42Id. ch. 4, § 9.1-9 A.
3Id. § 9.1-9 C.
'4 Id. § 9.1-9 D.
4Id. § 9.1-11.
46

Id.
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of the court in which the petition for adoption has been, or is to
be, filed, or before any other person designated or subsequently
approved by that court. 7 Practically, the consent will be signed
before the clerk of the court, unless the party signs it in another
jurisdiction. In that case, he must sign the consent before a
judge, and a certificate of magistry must be attached to the
form.48 Where the execution of a consent or surrender is acknowledged before someone other than a judge or clerk of a court
of record, that person must have his signature acknowledged
before a notary public according to the form provided by the
statute. 4 Upon proper acknowledgment by the signer of the
consent or surrender, the judge or other designated person will
complete the certificate of acknowledgment provided in the
statute, verifying that the signer appeared in person to acknowledge his free and voluntary signing of the consent or surrender,
and that the irrevocable relinquishment of all his parental rights
was fully explained.5
It should be emphasized that the sections dealing with consents must be strictly adhered to, for they will be strictly construed. While the execution of the consent pursuant to the Act
is prima facie evidence of its validity, such validity will be the
subject of a hearing preceding the granting of an adoption in all
cases other than that of a related child, an adult or an adoption
through an agency.1
Section 10 is generous in providing specific forms to cover
almost any situation. 5 2 Section 10E and F repeat the former
consent form for an adult adoption; all other consent and surrender forms are new and must be consulted.
Section 10A provides a final and irrevocable consent to the
adoption of a born child, and stresses the signer's understanding
of a permanent and irrevocable surrender of all parental rights.
Section 10B designates a similar form for the adoption of an
unborn child, and contains a statement by the father acknowledging his parenthood and his understanding that unless he
revokes consent within seventy-two hours after birth, it is irrevocable. Section 10C covers the surrender of a born child to an
agency, which is given full power to place the child with any persons it may select in its sole discretion. Section 10D adapts this
form to the unborn child situation. Despite the considerable
changes in procedure now required under the amended Act, the
legislature has left little to the imagination regarding the vital
47 Id. § 9.1-10 H.
48

Id. § 9.1-10 K.

49 Id.

50 Id. § 9.1-10 J.
.1 Id. § 9.1-13 A.
52 Id. § 9.1-10 A-F.
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matter of consent, and the wise attorney will heed its detailed
guidelines.
UNFITNESS -

A

SUBSTITUTE FOR CONSENT

The mandate that in every adoption the rights of both
parents must somehow be terminated echoes throughout the new
legislation.
A disclaimer of paternity, a failure to declare
paternity, or consent, equally affect termination of the rights of
the father of an illegitimate child.
But occasionally such a father may choose to exercise the
rights so recently bestowed upon him, and refuse to give his
consent. His motives may be malicious, or they may be benevolent, especially if his first awareness of the child's existence comes
through section 12a notice of his paternity and he reacts in a
fatherly fashion. 5 Whenever there is any refusal to consent,
whether the child to be adopted is legitimate or illegitimate, or
whether it is the mother or the father who refuses to consent,
if an adoption is to occur the only alternative is to seek termination of the parent's rights by a court order. The petition for
adoption must allege that the non-consenting parent is an "unfit
person" and it must also allege the grounds of unfitness as defined
5 4
in section 1 of the Adoption Act.
When an adoption petition rests on unfitness, the accused
party should ask for a hearing, which will be part of the adoption proceeding itself. The burden rests on the petitioner for
the adoption to show unfitness on the part of the parent, and
if the parent can show a valid defense, the petition for adoption
must be denied.
The court's determination of unfitness will necessarily depend on the facts in the particular case. The ground for unfitness most commonly claimed has been the abandonment of the
child, since desertion has required a period of more than three
nfionths preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding.
The reported cases concern only the abandonment and desertion
of the legitimate child, since before Stanley the father of an
illegitimate had no right to the child and his unfitness was never
litigated. In re Cech, the most recent case to focus on the subject, defines the two grounds:
Abandonment is conduct on the part of a parent which demonstrates a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and to relinquish all parental claims to the child. Desertion, as contemplated
by the Adoption Act, is any conduct on the part of a parent which
indicates an intention to permanently terminate custody over the
53 The guardian ad litem of the Circuit Court of Cook County views the
frequency of the latter occurrence with skepticism, but he recognizes the
possibility
exists and should be considered. See note 9 supra.
54
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 D (1973).
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child but not to relinquish all parental duties and claims to the
child.-',
A review of the cases reveals that the courts have been less
56
In re Cech 57
than liberal in finding abandonment or desertion.

involved a child whose parents were divorced, with the mother
being awarded custody. Both parties remarried, and the child's
mother and her new husband were granted their petition for
adoption. The natural father had not consented to the adoption.
The Illinois appellate court reversed the granting of the adoption, emphasizing that a petition for adoption must establish that
there has been a valid consent or that the person whose consent is
normally required is unfit. The court in Cech stated that parental rights should not be terminated unless a clear and convincing
case of the natural parents' unfitness has been made in strict
compliance with the adoption statute. The court was far from
convinced of Cech's unfitness. He had frequently seen the child
at his parents' home after separation from his wife; while he
had not exercised visitation rights because he did not want to
confront his former wife, he continuously inquired about his
son, sent him gifts, provided for his support, and maintained
hospitalization insurance for him. 58
Petition of Smith" involved two children, one born during
a marriage which ended in divorce, and the other after the
divorce while the mother was living with her former husband.
After the death of the mother, the petitioners, who had taken her
and the children into their home, filed for adoption. The appellate court in Smith affirmed both the trial court's granting of the
adoption of the illegitimate child on the ground of abandonment
by the father, and its refusal to grant the adoption of the legitimate child, who was returned to its father. The court stressed
that intent and examination of the father's conduct toward the
55 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 644, 291 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1972).
56 Perhaps the fact that a parent is interested enough to contest the
adoption provides a clue that he has steadily shown concern for the child.
Young v. Prather, 120 Ill. App. 2d 395, 256 N.E.2d 670 (1970) would seem
to support this view in that the court stated that where the natural parent
opposes and contests the adoption of his child, a preponderance of evidence
must show that the parent is unfit before the adoption decree will be
authorized.
In addition to the cases cited in the text where the court failed to find a
parent unfit on the grounds of abandonment and desertion, see also In re
Deerwater, 131 Ill. App. 2d 952, 267 N.E.2d 505 (1971) and Waldron v.
Waldron, 106 Ill. App. 2d 430, 245 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
57 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972).
58 The case seems to end in a stalemate.
The mother and her new
husband cannot adopt because Cech refused his consent and was not found
unfit. If Cech remarried, he and his new wife could not adopt unless the

natural mother consented or was found unfit, both of which seem unlikely. The situation is not serious because the child is legitimate, but in
the unique case where a father of an illegitimate will not consent and cannot
be found unfit, the child could be left with an illegitimate status.
59 4 Ill. App. 3d 261, 280 N.E.2d 770 (1972).
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child are proper areas of judicial inquiry. Today, under the new
legislation, the court's finding would probably apply to the illegitimate child as well.
In Robinson v. Neubauer,"" a mother died in childbirth and
the father left the child with its aunt and uncle. The court in
that case rejected the charge that he had abandoned his child,
even though he had visited the child only occasionally and had
acquiesced in the child's referring to the aunt and uncle as its
parents. The court found that the father had neither consented
to the adoption or intended to terminate his parental relationship, in that he had paid monthly support for the child and had
placed a monthly sum in a bank account.
An adoption was also denied in Carlson v. Oberling6' when
a divorced wife and her new husband petitioned for adoption.
Even though the natural father had paid only five months in
child support in over three years, the court found there was
neither abandonment nor desertion. The father had regularly
visited his child, conducted himself properly in regard to the
child, maintained insurance policies on her life, and, on occasion,
sent her gifts. However, the court in Houston v. Brackett62 did
find a father to be unfit on the ground of abandonment where the
father saw his two children only four times in the year following
divorce and his contribution to the care and welfare of the
children consisted of $45.00 and four valentines in over two
years.
In Thorp v. Thorp,63 an illegitimate situation, the court
failed to find either abandonment or desertion where the mother
of the illegitimate left the child with her uncle and aunt who
later filed to adopt the child. The mother had visited and cared
for the child on several occasions, had been kept informed of the
baby's welfare, had taken a small life insurance policy on the
child, had furnished some clothing and sent Christmas and
birthday presents to the child. While the courts may have
tended to favor the natural mother, even if unwed, there is yet
no precedent to rely on where the father contests in a similar
situation. Both Stanley and Slawek involved interested fathers, 14
so there are no cases under the new legislation to indicate
where the line will be drawn if the father falls just short of the
60 79 Ill. App. 2d 362, 223 N.E.2d 705 (1967).
6173 Ill. App. 2d 412, 218 N.E.2d 820 (1966).

Ill. App. 2d 463, 187 N.E.2d 545 (1963).
Ill. App. 2d 455, 198 N.E.2d 743 (1964). While the court did not
find that the mother intended to abandon or desert her child, the case was
remanded to allow the petitioners to amend the adoption petition so as to
charge the mother with another ground of unfitness - depravity and open
and notorious adultery or fornication.
6238

6348

64 Stanley may have been interested, but on remand the trial court found
him unfit and denied him custody of his children. See note 93 infra.
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usual pattern of disappearing upon discovery of his paternity.
However, it is important to note that while section 1 D (c)
of the Adoption Act retains the three month requirement for
desertion," section 1 D (k) has added as a separate ground for
unfitness, "Failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new born
child during the first 30 days after his birth." (emphasis added).
This section effectively reduces the period of desertion to thirty
days for the father of an illegitimate, closing a gap which might
otherwise delay prompt hearing of the adoption petition.
While it is difficult to predict precisely what will constitute
sufficient conduct for a finding of unfitness, it is suggested that,
under the new legislation, three grounds should be alleged by
adding the following paragraph to the petition for adoption
whenever appropriate:
That the father of the said child is an unfit person in that he has
abandoned and deserted said child for a period in excess of three
months prior to the filing of the adoption petition herein; and that
he failed to maintain a reasonable degree
of interest, concern or
66
responsibility as to the child's welfare.
THE ADOPTION PETITION

In addition to proper termination of parehtal rights, which
is simplified by the new legislation, due care must be given to
the requirements designated in the statute for the adoption petition itself. The amended Act retains all of the elements formerly required to accomplish a valid adoption. 67 The named
petitioners remain the parties who seek the Decree of Adoption.
In all cases, including a related adoption, the petition must state
the names, residence, and length of residence in Illinois of the
petitioner. It must also state the child's name, place and date
68
of birth, sex, and relationship, if any, to each petitioner.
If a natural parent seeks to adopt his own child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, he is named as a petitioner. Otherwise, the minor child and both natural parents must be named
as parties defendant.6 9 Where the father is unknown, the petition should identify him as "unknown father of Baby (Boy's
name) or (Girl's name) (Mother's Maiden Name) and all whom
it may concern. ' 0
ch. 4, § 9.1-1 D (1973).
The office of the guardian ad litem of the Circuit Court of Cook County
suggests adding this paragraph to Parnell's Forms # 1 and # 1-A as
well as to related adoption Forms # 6 and 10; the paragraph should also
be included as a finding of the court in the Adoption Decree.
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-5 (1973).
66 If an adoption pertains to other than that of a related child, sections
5 B (c) (g) and (h) should be specially consulted.
65

ILL. REV. STAT.

66

69 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-7 A (1973).
70

The office of the guardian ad litem uses this form where the putative

father cannot be identified.
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Section 5f has been added 71 to provide that the names of the
natural parents shall be omitted as parties defendant if their
rights have been terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction,
if the child has been surrendered to an agency, or if a parent who
was served with section 12a notice either filed a disclaimer of
paternity, failed to file a declaration of paternity, or failed to
request notice of the adoption.
As already discussed in detail, the adoption petition must
include the consent of any person or agency required to give
consent, or an allegation that the person having authority to
consent is unfit, with a statement on the ground of unfitness.
The petition should likewise include a request that the court
appoint a guardian ad ]item to represent the child sought to be
adopted; such guardian will have the power to consent to the
adoption, if his consent is needed. 2
In addition, the petition
should ask the court to appoint a suitable agency or person to
investigate the allegations in the petition, as required in all
adoptions except those involving a related child.7 3
SERVICE OF PROCESS AND PUBLICATION

Once the petition for adoption is properly filed, notice of
the proceeding must be given to all parties defendant, known
or unknown.14 Section 20 of the Adoption Act specifies that the
provisions of the Civil Practice Act will apply to the proceedings.
Hence, if the defendants are known and can be located, they
must be served either personally or by substitute service.75
Service of process can be waived by any person over fourteen
76
years of age, if he enters an appearance in writing.
If a defendant is difficult to locate, the pursuit does not end
with a "returned mail" postmark. As -in any civil proceeding,
due diligence and inquiry must be expended to determine his
whereabouts. If a defendant cannot be located after due search,
or his identity is altogether unknown, the statute allows publication of the proceeding.7 7 However, the petitioner must file an
affidavit with the court, indicating that the defendant resides or
has gone out of the state, or on due inquiry cannot be found,
or that he is concealed within the state so that process cannot be
served upon him. 7 1 Whenever there is any doubt about the
71ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-5(f)

(1973).
Id. § 9.1-13 B (a).
73 Id.
§ 9.1-6. The section preserves the protection afforded all investigatory reports by forbidding their inclusion in the proceeding or in any of
the hearings. However, the court must inform the petitioners of any adverse findings which might defeat the adoption decree.
74 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-7 (1973).
75 Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110, § 13.2 (1971).
76 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-7 A (1973).
72

77
78

Id.
Id.
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identity of the father, as where the mother admits to more than
one paramour, notice by publication should be given, in addition
to personal service to any individuals who are named. This
procedure eliminates a future claim of fatherhood by some unsuspected candidate.
Publication must contain notice of the pending action, the
name of the person to be adopted, the name of the defendants
being served and/or "to whom it may concern," and the date
of default. 9 The publication must not contain the name of the
petitioners, the name of any party who has surrendered the child
or given consent to its adoption, or the name of any parent
whose rights were otherwise terminated by the court2 0
Where an adoption involves a related child, a child who has
been surrendered to an agency, or an adult, the court can enter
a decree of adoption any time after service of process and the
designated return day." No investigation is necessary, unless
8
deemed so by the court.

2

In any other adoption, the court will temporarily commit the
child to an agency or to a person it deems competent, including
the petitioners, as dictated by the welfare of the child.83 After
six months, the petitioners can apply to the court for a decree of
adoption, notice of which is served on the investigating agency
and the guardian ad litem.8 4 When the court is satisfied that the
adoption is for the welfare of the child, that all consents are
either valid or not required, and that parental rights have been
properly terminated, the court will enter the decree.8 , The
natural parents are thereby relieved of all responsibility, as well
as all legal rights, to the child."6
The adoption decree can be appealed in the same manner as
in any other civil proceeding, but, of course, no appeal can be
taken more than thirty days after the decree has become final.,,
THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD

The strict procedural routine delineated in the Adoption Act
is based on one overriding concern - the welfare of a child
whose fate and future are being shaped by a court determination.
In the past, the provisions of the Adoption Act generally
incorporated the concept of concern for the child,88 but lack of
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. § 9.1-14.
82

8

Id. § 9.1-6.

3 Id. § 9.1-13 B (c).
14 Id. § 9.1-14.

85 Id.
86

Id. § 9.1-17.

87 Id. § 9.1-20.

8 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-13 B(c); 9.1-14; 9.1-15, which provides for consideration of the child's religious belief, whenever possible.
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precision gave the attorney little legal support for his contention
that, in the final analysis, the adoption was to be decided from
the child's standpoint.
The courts have not always subordinated their decisions to
the child's welfare. It should be noted that the court in In re
9
Cechs
did not hesitate to overturn the adoption even though the
welfare of the child might have been better served by allowing
the mother and her new husband to adopt the child. The court in
Cech stated that while the welfare of the child may be the decisive criterion in awarding custody in divorce and separate
maintenance cases, it is not the sole dictate of the result in
adoption proceedings. The court further stated:
The nature of adoption necessitates an appraisal of the effect not
only upon the child but also upon the natural parent ...
Although, as an abstract proposition, the welfare of Denis
might be better served by avoiding intrusion into his present home
life by his natural father, the rights of the father and his readiness to support and educate his son must be respected.90
The new legislation remedies the statutory deficiency by
isolating the issue of the child's welfare in a separate provision
that "[t] he best interests and welfare of the person to be adopted
shall be of paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this Act."'" This legislative action reflects the
concern of the United States Supreme Court exhibited in Rothstein, in which, despite reversal, the Court directed that due
consideration be given on rehearing to the completion of the
adoption proceedings and the fact that "the child has apparently
lived with the adoptive family for the intervening period of
92
time.',
In certain situations, the new provision in the Adoption Act
will influence the outcome of a case. Where both natural parents
are deceased, for example, a number of parties may seek to adopt
the child, especially if there is an inheritance involved. The
Illinois court should now objectively decide whether an aunt, or
grandparents or any other interested party is best suited to
adopt, or perhaps determine that no adoption at all is in order
89 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972).
90 Id. at 645-46,.291 N.E.2d at 24. See also In re Petition of Smith,
4 Ill. App. 3d 261, 265, 280 N E.2d 770, 773 (1972), quoting Jackson v.
Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951) that,
The welfare of the child is a much more appropriate yard stick in a
custody case than in an adoption matter. Adoption, which affects the
course of inheritance, deprives the child of a place in which it was
placed by nature, and by force of law thrusts the child into another
relationship, while severing forever conclusively the legal rights and
interests of the natural parents, and is a very different matter from a
change in custody, which could be on a temporary basis.
9' ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20a (1973).
92 Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
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until the child is old enough to decide for himself. Above all,
the new legislation focuses legal concern where it should be on the child.
CONCLUSION

The amended Adoption Act represents the Illinois legislature's prompt response to the dictate of the United States Supreme Court in Stanley that the father of an illegitimate child is
constitutionally entitled to the same rights as any other parent
whenever custody or adoption of his children are involved.
However, while the changes in the Act afford the father
substantial protection before his parental rights can be terminated, at the same time they have created certain complications.
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court referred almost
reverently to the importance of the family and to the basic civil
right to "conceive and raise one's children," and to prepare
a child "for obligations which the state can neither supply
or hinder." 93 The Court embraced the father of an illegitimate
child in its concern for the preservation of the right. But in
many cases, the reality of the father's disappearance as soon as
he discovers his paternity seems to contradict the Court's concern
for his abstract rights. The question emerges whether a father
who has actual knowledge of the birth of his child and who has
failed to demonstrate any interest in it whatsoever ought to be
considered a father as far as legal rights are involved. In a
strong dissenting opinion to Stanley, Justice Burger recognized
this problem when he argued that the Equal Protection Clause
is not violated when Illinois gives "full recognition only to those
father-child relationships that arise in the context of family
units bound together by legal obligations arising from marriage
or from adoption proceedings." Justice Burger further noted:
Quite apart from the religious or quasi-religious connotations
that marriage has - and has historically enjoyed - for a large
proportion of this Nation's citizens, it is in law an essentially
contractual relationship, the parties to which have legally enforceable rights and duties, with respect both to each other and to
any children born to them. Stanley and the mother of these
children never entered such a relationship.... .. Stanley did not
seek the burdens when he could have freely assumed them.9 4
The question of the wholly disinterested father of an illegitimate
has not yet been fully explored, since the cases giving rise to the
new legislation never disputed the father's interest and support.
9"Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). The Court's somewhat
edifying language seems especially inappropriate in reference to Stanley.
The lower court on remand ruled that he was depraved on account of sexual
advances made toward his older daughter; in a subsequent hearing the court
said he was still unfit to have the two younger children.
94 Id. at 663, 664.
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A strong temptation persists to ignore the existence of one who
has steadily rejected or ignored his right to his child, a right "far
more precious than property rights. ' 1115 Under the new legislation, this temptation clearly must be resisted.
Other considerations deserve scrutiny. The requirement
that the unwed mother, about to marry another, must now contact
the natural father may prove socially undesirable. Likewise,
the possibility is present that the unwed mother may have to
name more than one likely prospect as the father, all of whom
must seemingly now consent, or at least must receive notice of
her intention to place the child for adoption. The matter of
rightfully identifying the father without the benefit of his name
on a birth certificate or in a paternity suit presents its own
problem. Caution must be exercised so that the mother alone
remains liable for improper identification. Even where the
father is rightfully named, if his paternity occurred outside an
existing marriage, his identification can produce a disastrous
impact on the marriage.
These situations will undoubtedly be debated.", Hopefully
they will be resolved. But at the present time it is clear that if an
adoption is to stand unchallenged under the new legislation, the
attorney must know what changes have been made in the Adoption Act, and he must carefully follow the procedures outlined
by them. The goal to be achieved is an adoption which can
withstand attack, not only in the immediate proceedings, but in
future ones. The new legislation provides guidelines for almost
every situation that may arise. The reversal of even one established adoption because of procedural ineptness is inexcusable
where the welfare and stability of a child are affected.
Imelda R. Terrazino

Id. at 651.
96 See Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley" - Rights for Fathers of
Illegitimate Children, 61 ILL. B.J. 350 (March 1973), which examines some
of the ramifications of Stanley.
95

